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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had granted a bank a security
interest in farm livestock, products, inventory, equipment,
accounts, instruments, crops and all proceeds of collateral.
The debtor sold several items of collateral, including crops,
equipment and livestock, without permission of the bank
and without remitting the proceeds to the bank to pay on the
loan. Two tractors were sold or traded-in to purchase
another tractor and when the bank inquired about the new
tractor and the absence of the old tractors, the debtor stated
that the new tractor was only leased and the old tractors
were being repaired. The debtor sold some grain under the
name of the debtor’s three-month old son and forged the
son’s signature on the check. In order to hide the
transactions, the debtor deposited the proceeds in the
spouse’s account in a separate bank. All of the proceeds
were used for personal expenses. The debtor also failed to
list the debtor’s eligibility for CRP payments, although the
debtor claimed that the payments were not listed because the
debtor may not have been eligible for the payments because
of contract violations. The bank sought to deny the debtor’s
Chapter 7 discharge. The court held that the repeated sales
of collateral and attempts to hide the transactions
demonstrated a willful intent to harm the secured creditor
and justified denial of discharge of the bank’s claim.
However, the court held that the general discharge would
still be allowed. In re Zinke, 174 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption in a residence in which the debtor had $2,100 in
equity after two consensual liens. The property was also
subject to two judgment liens far in excess of the value of
the property. The court held that the judgment liens were
voidable only to the extent of the debtor’s equity in the
property as of the date of the petition. In re Menell, 160
B.R. 524 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1993), aff’d, 174 B.R. 685 (D.
N.J. 1994), aff’d, 37 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1994).
SETOFF. The debtors owed the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation for crop insurance premiums for 1992. The
debtors’ 1992 income tax return claimed a refund and the
FCIC filed an administrative offset with the IRS for a
portion of the refund equal to the unpaid premium. The
offset was made less than 90 days before the bankruptcy
filing and the debtors sought recovery of the offset amount.
The court held that the FCIC offset was allowed because
both debts occurred prepetition and the FCIC and IRS are
considered the same for the purposes of mutuality of the
prepetition debts. The debtors argued that the setoff was not
allowed because the refund did not arise until less than 90
days before the petition, when the income tax return was
filed. The court held that the debtors became eligible for the
refund at the end of the taxable year to which the refund
applied. In re Kalenze, 175 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors had completed
their five-year Chapter 12 plan and sought a discharge. The
unsecured creditors objected to the discharge because the
debtors did not pay all of their disposable income during the
plan. The debtors argued that they should have been allowed
to deduct depreciation from disposable income and that the
disposable income should have been calculated over the
entire five years and not annually. The court held that
depreciation was not a deduction allowed from disposable
income because the statute allowed only for expenses paid
by the debtors. The court also held that disposable income
was to be determined in each year of the plan because of
case law precedents and because the plan provided for
annual payments, indicating the debtors’ intent to make
disposable income payments annually. The debtors also
sought a hardship discharge, arguing that it was the trustee’s
responsibility to see that all payments were made annually
and disposable income was calculated accurately; therefore,
the debtors’ failure to make the additional disposable
income payments was not their fault. The court denied the
hardship discharge and held that the debtors had the
responsibility to comply with the statute and plan provisions
and that the trustee’s duty is only to monitor the plan
payments.  In re Linden, 174 B.R. 769 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS. The Chapter 12
debtors reached an agreement with a secured creditor for a
cash payment and turnover of farm equipment in satisfaction
of the secured claim. The money and equipment were to be
paid “promptly” upon court approval. Although the debtors
quickly transferred the property, the cash was not paid. The
creditor sought rescission of the agreement and the
Bankruptcy Court allowed rescission under “bankruptcy
law” without citing any authority. The District Court held
that rescission was improper because the bankruptcy court
made no finding of fraud, bad faith, mutual mistake, or
actual or construction repudiation by the debtors. The court
also held that rescission under general bankruptcy court
equitable powers was inappropriate because the debtors
could not be returned to the original status before the
agreement was made. In re Mettlen, 174 B.R. 822 (D. Kan.
1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a claim for unpaid federal
income taxes, including the taxable year just before the
filing of the petition. The claim included secured and
unsecured claims. The debtors filed their income tax return
for the year just prior to filing for bankruptcy and the return
claimed a refund. The debtors did not object to the IRS
claims which were reduced by the taxes paid on the new
return, but the debtors’ plan did not list the IRS claims as
secured or unsecured, although the plan provided for full
payment of all taxes. The IRS sought to offset the last tax
income tax refund against its secured claims. The court held
that the setoff was allowed because the debtors did not
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object to the secured claim filed by the IRS. The court held
that the confirmation of a plan which did not characterize
the claim as secured did not function as an objection to the
secured status of the claim; therefore, the secured status of
the claim was not changed by the plan. Matter of Olson,
175 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994).
PLAN. The debtor’s Chapter 11 plan provided that all
liens on claims paid in the plan were to be reduced to the
amount of property securing the liens. The plan was
confirmed without objection and the debtor sought to have
the liens released. The IRS had filed a secured claim in the
case and objected to the lien release, arguing that the plan
provision “stripping down” its lien to the value of the
collateral was not enforceable because the Bankruptcy Court
was without jurisdiction to approve the provision which was
contrary to Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). The
court held that provisions of a confirmed plan are res
judicata unless the result of fraud or lack of due process. The
court found that no fraud was charged by the IRS and the
IRS had sufficient notice and opportunity to object to the
plan to satisfy due process concerns. Therefore, the IRS lien
was reduced to the value of the collateral. The court held
that Dewsnup v. Timm, did not apply to Chapter 11 cases;
therefore, the plan provision was not contrary to that case.
In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
TAX LIENS. In May through September 1992, the IRS
made assessments for unpaid taxes owed by the debtor. In
October 1992, the debtor transferred the debtor’s interest in
a house to the debtor’s spouse who was obtaining a divorce
from the debtor. In December 1992, the spouse sold the
house to a third party. In January 1993, the IRS filed its lien
against the debtor’s property. The IRS levied against and
sold the debtor’s personal property just prior to the debtor’s
filing for bankruptcy but the IRS returned the proceeds to
the estate. The trustee also obtained money from the
debtor’s ex-spouse as a settlement for an action to recover
for the debtor’s transfer of the debtor’s interest in the house
in October 1992. The IRS claimed it had a secured claim as
to the levy proceeds and the settlement proceeds based on its
pre-petition lien filing. The court held that once the real
property was sold to a good faith purchaser prior to the
filing of the lien, the lien could not attach to the property.
The IRS argued that the recovery of the money from the ex-
spouse voided the transfer as to that money and reinstated
the tax lien. The court also held that the lien did not re-
attach after the trustee recovered the money, reasoning that a
lien does not re-attach by means of a trustee’s preference
action. The IRS was allowed a secured claim as to the
proceeds of the sale of the personal property because the lien
was filed before the sale and before the petition. In re Watt,
174 B.R. 942 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
The debtors’ bankruptcy estate included real property
inherited more than 11 years before the bankruptcy filing.
The decedent’s estate elected to make the federal estate tax
payments in 10 annual installments but an amount was still
owed on the date of the petition. The IRS filed a claim for
the taxes, asserting a lien against the decedent’s property.
The IRS acknowledged that its estate tax lien had expired
after ten years but the IRS argued that Ill. Probate Act ¶
5/18-14 allowed probate estate property to remain subject to
charges against the estate. The IRS argued that this statute
created a lien against the decedent’s property which had not
expired. The court held that Ill. Probate Code § 20-4(c)
(1979) limited this charge to three years after the decedent’s
death. The IRS responded that the state limitations period
did not apply to the IRS. The court held that the state laws
did not create a lien against the estate property and that the
limitations period did not run as to the IRS claim but to the
state statute which the IRS claimed created the IRS’s
claimed lien; therefore, the IRS had no claim against the
debtors’ property. In re White, 174 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1994).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The defendants had suffered a loss of their
hogs from disease and entered into an oral contract with the
plaintiff to raise hogs purchased by the defendants, with
each party to receive a portion of the new pigs bred by the
plaintiff. A portion of the proceeds from the sale of hogs
was to pay for feed. The defendants contracted with a feed
supplier for the feed for the hog operation but the plaintiff
switched to another supplier after the young pigs began
dying and having other health problems. The defendants
then notified the plaintiff that the contract was terminated
and the plaintiff sued for an injunction against removal of
the hogs. The court held that the termination of the contract
was a breach of the contract because the contract was not
indefinite or at will. The court found that the parties had
intended the contract to last for three years because that was
the expected time needed to replenish the defendant’s herd
and the plaintiff had leased the premisses for three years. In
addition, the court held that the defendants had breached the
contract provision to supply the best feed since the evidence
showed that the feed was causing the loss of the pigs. The
court found no breach by the plaintiff for poor husbandry
practices since a veterinarian had testified that the plaintiff’s
management of the farrowing operation was very good. The
court also held that the plaintiff had the right to possession
of the hogs under a herder’s lien, Iowa Code § 579.1, for the
plaintiff’s efforts in raising the hogs.  Keppy v. Lilienthal,
524 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations increasing the indemnity for brucellosis reactor
and exposed cattle and bison destroyed during herd
depopulation or after being sold or traded from a herd
subsequently found to be infected with brucellosis. 60 Fed.
Reg. 5837 (Jan. 31, 1995).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
issued proposed regulations amending the nursery crop
endorsement to the Common Crop Insurance Policy to add a
nursery frost, freeze and cold damage exclusion option. 60
Fed. Reg. 5339 (Jan. 27, 1995).
IMPORTS. The CFSA has adopted as final regulations
implementing the end-use certificate program for wheat and
barley imported from any foreign country. 60 Fed. Reg.
5087 (Jan. 26, 1995).
PRODUCTION ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS. The
CCC has issued proposed regulations governing several
aspects of the 1995 wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice
programs, including reducing the advance deficiency
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payment to 50 percent of the final estimated payment for
1995 and to 40 percent for 1996 and 1997 crops. The
proposed regulations allow producers to plant minor
oilseeds, soybeans and mung beans on up to 50 percent of
the designated ACR acreage. 60 Fed. Reg. 4571 (Jan. 24,
1995).
TOBACCO. The CCC has proposed regulations for the
possible 1995 marketing quota ranges for tobacco:
   Kind and Type                                                                                   Million pounds  
Virginia fire-cured(type 21) 1.5 to 2
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23) 32 to 40
Dark air-cured(types 35-36) 8 to 10
Virginia sun-cured(type 37) 0.08 to .1
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55) 8 to 10
Cigar filler (type 46) 0
60 Fed. Reg. 4871 (Jan. 25, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s surviving spouse elected to take the Tennessee
statutory elective share of the decedent’s estate. The elective
share was approved by the probate court and the estate
distributed property equal to the full share without reduction
for a pro rata share of the decedent’s secured debt. Citing
Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 451 (1994) which
also involved the same Tennessee law, the court held that
under Tennessee law, the elective share had to be reduced
by the pro rata share of secured debts. Estate of
Tenenbaum v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-48.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s estate included undivided interests in six ranches.
The other interests were owned by qualified heirs who
acquired the interests prior to the decedent’s death. The
decedent’s interests passed to the taxpayer, another qualified
heir.  In order to obtain financing, the heirs exchanged
interests in the ranches such that the taxpayer’s interest in
one ranch increased and the taxpayer owned all of another
ranch. The IRS ruled that the exchanges would not cause
recapture of special use valuation so long as the values of
the properties exchanged were the same and the exchanges
met the requirements of I.R.C. § 1031. The IRS refused to
rule on a request for partial revocation of the special use
valuation election. Ltr. Rul. 9502015, Oct. 21, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].* The decedent and spouse had
transferred title in two farms to two Illinois land trusts with
the decedent and spouse each retaining a 50 percent interest
in each trust. The trust provided that at least three of the
beneficiaries owning at least two-thirds of the trust’s
interests had the power to direct the trustee to sell or
mortgage the trust property. The beneficiaries retained
control over the use of and income from the trust property.
The decedent had transferred by gift all of the 50 percent
interest in the first trust, with 12.96 percent transferred
within three years of death. The decedent had transferred by
gift 29.4 percent of the other trust interest, all within three
years of death. The estate argued that the decedent’s power
over the trust was not governed by I.R.C. § 2038 because the
decedent did not have the power to divest the other
beneficiaries of their interests in the trust property.  The IRS
ruled that Section 2038 applied if the decedent had the
power alone or in conjunction with any other person to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate the enjoyment of the property.
Because the decedent had the power to revoke the trust and
sell the property in conjunction with less than all of the
current beneficiaries when the gifts were made within three
years of death, the decedent had the power to alter the
timing of the enjoyment of the trust property during the
three years before death. The IRS also cited Adolphson v.
U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,048 (C.D. Ill. 1990) in
support of its ruling.  Ltr. Rul. 9502005, Sept. 9, 1994.
VALUATION. The taxpayers had purchased a vacation
home which was located on the east side of a street. The
taxpayers later purchased two lots on the west side of the
street which had a view of and access to a waterfront of a
bay. The two west lots were used by the taxpayers as a boat
launch and other family activities. The properties were
transferred to a trust and the taxpayers sought a ruling that
the two west lots were includible in the residence for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. The IRS ruled that the two west
lots were not in excess of what was reasonably appropriate
for residential purposes under Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)
and would be eligible for the qualified personal residence
trust exception to I.R.C. § 2702. Ltr. Rul. 9502025, Oct.
27, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CAPITAL EXPENSES. A limited partnership and
related S corporation owned land which was to be developed
for a housing subdivision. For the taxable years involved,
the companies incurred costs for property taxes, permits,
feasibility studies, labor and other requirements for the first
step in the development process. No construction or other
property improvements had taken place and the companies
argued that the costs of development were not required to be
capitalized because no property had yet been produced. The
court held that the activities of the companies were
sufficient to have “produced” the property for purposes of
requiring capitalization of the indirect costs related to
development of the property and all the direct costs. Von-
Lusk v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. No. 8 (1995).
COMMODITY STRADDLES. The taxpayer was an
attorney who invested in commodity straddles. In one
taxable year, the taxpayer had losses and gains from straddle
transactions and claimed a deduction for the amount of
losses exceeding the gains. The court held that the taxpayer
was limited to deduct losses only to the extent of the gains
because the taxpayer was not in the trade or business of
commodity transactions. Nolte v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1995-57.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM §
4.02[15].* The taxpayers had filed a Chapter 11 case and
received a discharge of debts. The bankruptcy trustee filed a
final estate income tax return which listed significant net
operating losses remaining. The taxpayer offset their
postbankruptcy income by these NOLs. The taxpayers
argued that the NOLs were not required to be reduced by the
amount of discharge of indebtedness income because the
discharge of indebtedness occurred with the bankruptcy
estate and the NOLs passed to the taxpayers. The court held
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that the NOLs were reduced by the amount of discharge of
indebtedness income whether or not the trustee noted the
reduction. Because the taxpayers failed to provide any
evidence that the discharge of indebtedness income was less
than the NOLS, no NOL deduction was allowed. Firsdon v.
U.S. 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,040 (N.D. Ohio
1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer
operated a horse training and breeding activity. The court
found that the taxpayer had little expertise in this area,
devoted less than full time to the activity and had no
reasonable expectation of appreciation in value of the
horses. The court held that the taxpayer could not claim
deductions for expenses in excess of income because the
taxpayer did not operated the activity in a business-like
manner with the intent to make a profit.  Bischoff v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-34.
INTEREST. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for
interest on a note secured by a farm which the taxpayer used
as a second residence; however, the taxpayer did not identify
the farm as a second residence until after filing the petition
in the Tax Court for a refund. The court held that the
deduction was allowed because there was no time limit for
an election to claim a property as a second residence for
purposes of the interest deduction. Lawler v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-26.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayers renovated a duplex which the taxpayers used as
their residence and rented the other half to third parties. The
duplex was a qualified rehabilitated building and the
renovation expenses were qualified rehabilitation expenses
but the taxpayers were not eligible for the 10 percent
investment tax credit because the duplex was not a certified
historic structure and the taxpayers and renters used the
building for residential purposes. Johnston v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-36.
The taxpayer had purchased I.R.C. § 38 property in 1985
which was placed in service in 1986, and 1987. Because the
taxpayer had investment tax credit carryforwards from
previous years, the full credit for 1986 and 1987 could not
be claimed and also had to be carried forward and was
reduced to the amount allowable in the later years. The
taxpayer reduced the basis of the property by the amount of
investment tax credit eventually allowed for each property
and not for the amount of investment tax credit allowable in
the tax year the property was placed in service. The court
held that the statute was clear that the basis reduction was to
be determined in the year the investment tax credit amount
is determined, the tax year the property was placed in
service, and there was no provision for later adjustment of
the basis reduction to account for a lesser allowed
investment tax credit. The B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,050 (Fed. Cl. 1995).
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has issued procedures
and fees for requests for background documents associated
with letter rulings or technical advice memoranda issued by
the National Office. Rev. Proc. 95-15, I.R.B. 1995-5, 49.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in January
1995, the weighted average is 7.27 percent with the
permissible range of 6.55 to 7.93 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.55 to 8.00 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
6, I.R.B. 1995-5, 47.
R E F U N D S . The taxpayer was an agricultural
cooperative which had changed its tax year in 1983. The
IRS had approved the tax year change and required a
separate return for the short tax year created by the change.
The cooperative had a net operating loss for the short tax
year which it was prevented from carrying back under the
tax year change agreement with the IRS. The cooperative
was unable to use the net operating loss in the next full tax
year and filed for a refund based upon the carryback of the
unused net operating loss to the tax year prior to the short
taxable year, essentially challenging the agreement
provision prohibiting the carryback. The IRS challenged the
refund suit on the basis that the refund was not sought
within three years after the date of the return for the short
tax year in which the net operating loss arose. The
cooperative argued that the operative tax year was the year
after the short taxable year because it was that year which
failed to use the entire net operating losses and required the
carry back of the losses. The court held that the three year
period for filing refunds started in the tax year the net
operating loss arose. Glenwood Coop., Inc. v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,051 (Fed. Cl. 1995).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
February 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 7.43 7.30 7.23 7.19
110% AFR 8.19 8.03 7.95 7.90
120% AFR 8.95 8.76 8.67 8.60
Mid-term
AFR 7.96 7.81 7.74 7.69
110% AFR 8.77 8.59 8.50 8.44
120% AFR 9.59 9.37 9.26 9.19
Long-term
AFR 8.07 7.91 7.83 7.78
110% AFR 8.89 8.70 8.61 8.55
120% AFR 9.72 9.49 9.38 9.31
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ACCUMULATED ADJUSTMENTS ACCOUNT. The
taxpayer owned shares of an S corporation along with the
taxpayer’s child. The S corporation had subchapter C
earnings. In one tax year the corporation redeemed some of
the taxpayer’s stock for cash and the redemption was not
treated as a sale or exchange under I.R.C. §§ 302(a), 303(a).
At the end of the tax year, the taxpayer’s basis in stock
exceeded the amount of the redemption distribution and the
corporation’s accumulated adjustments account (AAA) also
exceeded the redemption amount. The IRS ruled that
because Sections 302(a) and 303(a) did not apply to the
redemption, Section 301 applied. The IRS also ruled that the
redemption distribution was not included in the taxpayer’s
income because the corporation had an AAA in excess of
the redemption amount and the taxpayer's basis exceeded the
redemption amount. The IRS also ruled that the entire
redemption amount would be used to decrease the AAA.
Rev. Rul. 95-14, I.R.B. 1995-6, 29.
TAX YEAR. An S corporation sold more than 50
percent of its stock to new shareholders; however, the
corporation did not change its taxable year to meet the
requirements of I.R.C. § 1378(c) that the taxable year of the
corporation match the tax years of a majority of the
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shareholders. The court held that failure to adopt a permitted
tax year caused the termination of S corporation status, even
though this cause of termination was not listed in I.R.C. §
1362(d). Farmers Gin, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1995-25.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers transferred
their residence to their child subject to an usufruct (life
estate) for the taxpayers. The court held that the taxpayers
were not entitled to the one-time exclusion of gain under
I.R.C. § 121 because the taxpayers did not transfer a
residence but only a future interest in the property. Roy v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-23.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . A self-employed logger was
allowed to deduct the costs of transportation from the
taxpayer’s residence to the first logging site and from the
last logging site back to the residence because the taxpayer
met the requirements of Rev. Rul. 90-23, 1990-1 C.B. 28.
Stalcup v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-43; Merritt v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-44.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TERMINATION. The parties entered into a three year
lease under which the defendant farmed the plaintiff’s
farmland for a share of the crop. The defendant agreed to
farm the land in a “farmer-like manner.” The plaintiff
terminated the lease in the middle of the term, alleging that
the defendant did not farm the land in a farmer-like manner.
The defendant sought recovery of lost profits based on
breach of the lease by the plaintiff. The jury verdict awarded
the defendant the amount of profit which would have been
realized on a crop which would have been produced during
the remainder of the lease. The trial judge reversed the jury
verdict and the defendant appealed. The appellate court held
that the jury had sufficient evidence of the defendant’s
actions to determine that the defendant did not breach the
lease requirement of farmer-like practices and that the
plaintiff’s early termination of the lease was a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
appellate court also held that the jury had sufficient evidence
of the productivity of the farm land, ironically from the
plaintiff’s own witnesses, to determine the amount of lost
profits from the early termination of the lease. Therefore, the
appellate court reinstated the jury verdict. The plaintiff had
also sought to provide evidence on the meaning of the
contract terms, such as “farmer-like manner,” but was
prevented by the trial court. The appellate court held that the
trial court did not commit reversible error because the court
allowed testimony of neighboring farmers as to their
practices in obtaining their yields. This testimony was
sufficient for the jury to decide if the defendant had
breached the lease prior to termination. Fox Grain & Cattle
Co. v. Maxwell, 885 P.2d 432 (Mont. 1994).
NUISANCE
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY-ALM § 13.08.*
When the plaintiff purchased the land neighboring the
defendant’s property in 1988, the defendant had operated
three turkey houses for more than one year on the
defendant’s property. The plaintiff purchased the
neighboring property for residential development and had
begun selling lots when the defendant constructed a large
hog confinement facility on the defendant’s property. The
plaintiff brought a nuisance action and sought to enjoin the
operation of the confinement operation. The defendant
argued that the North Carolina “right to farm” act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 106-701 prohibited a nuisance suit because the
defendant’s farm operation pre-dated the plaintiff’s purchase
of the neighboring land by over one year. The court held that
the statute applied only as to the existing nature of the farm
operation, i.e., the turkey houses, and that the one year
requirement applied anew to the new hog confinement
operation; therefore, the nuisance suit was not prohibited by
Section 106-701. The defendant also argued that the
confinement operation's compliance with the Federal
Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act preempted
any nuisance action. The court held that the federal statute
contained no provision covering preemption of state
nuisance actions. Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994).
PROBATE
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The debtors’
bankruptcy estate included real property inherited more than
11 years before the bankruptcy filing. The inherited land
was to be sold during the bankruptcy case and the
decedent’s executor claimed a portion of the proceeds of
crops grown on the land to cover the federal estate tax
liability of the decedent’s estate. As with a similar claim
filed by the IRS, see case summary supra, the court held that
the administrative expense charges against the decedent’s
estate property expired three years after the decedent’s
death. The court also held that under Illinois probate law, the
crops would be considered income of the estate and could
not be used to satisfy administrative expenses; therefore, the
proceeds of the crops belonged to the debtors as heirs and
their bankruptcy estate. In re White, 174 B.R. 779 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
PULLEY. The plaintiff operated a grain elevator which
was built by one defendant with a pulley head drive unit
purchased from another defendant and manufactured by
another defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the pulley
became loose and travelled along its axle until it scraped
against the pulley housing, causing sparks which ignited
grain dust in the elevator.  The trial court dismissed the
builder defendant as not having any ability to alter or check
the drive unit during installation. The court also dismissed
the purchaser of the unit because the purchaser also had no
knowledge that the unit was defective. The court held that a
nonmanufacturer seller had no duty to inspect a product to
determine its safety. The trial court ruled that the defendant
manufacturer was not liable for the explosion because the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the pulley was the cause
of the explosion. The plaintiff claimed that the screws
holding the pulley were not sufficiently tight to prevent the
traveling of the pulley. The defendant had presented
evidence of a test of a similar pulley with screws tightened
similarly to the installed pulley and the test showed that the
pulley would not have traveled under similar conditions.
The court held that the plaintiff’s failure to counter this test
evidence and failure to sufficiently rule out other causes was
adequate support for the trial court’s judgment for the
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defendant. Ferruzzi, U.S.A., Inc. v. R.J. Tricon Co., 645
So.2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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TRESPASS
CONVERSION. The plaintiff and defendant were
neighbors and the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s
cattle crossed on to the defendant’s land. The defendant
penned the cattle and transported them to an auction house
where the cattle were sold. The plaintiff sued for
conversion. The defendant argued that Ala. Code §§ 3-2-1,
3-5-6 allowed the defendant to take control of the cattle and
dispose of them without notifying the plaintiff. However,
the statute allows such actions only where the owner of the
trespassing cattle is unknown and the defendant testified
that none of the neighbors was notified about the cattle to
discover who owned the cattle. In addition, evidence was
presented that a long standing animosity existed between
the parties. The appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the
plaintiff based on sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
Watson v. Thomas, 646 So.2d 84 (Ala. Ct. App. 1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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